こういうツイートを見かけました。
チェコの中国研究プロジェクトによる中国共産党による仏教団体を通じたモンゴル、日本、オーストラリアへの浸透工作について解説した報告書。
チェコの中国研究プロジェクトによる中国共産党による仏教団体を通じたモンゴル、日本、オーストラリアへの浸透工作について解説した報告書。https://t.co/B0GCH0NYgi
— Okuyama, Masashi ┃奥山真司 (@masatheman) July 24, 2022
その報告書の全文(英語)はPDFで公開されています。
→The party in monk’s robes: The cultivation of global Buddhism within CCP influence operations
https://sinopsis.cz/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/buddhism0.pdf
中身をザッと拝見すると、章立てで序章、モンゴルの次に第2章として日本のことが書かれてあり、
“浄土宗”
“日中友好仏教協会”
“日中友好浄土宗協会”
“福原隆善”
“中国国际友好联络会”
“阿含宗”
“創価学会”
“公明党”
“池田大作”
“竹入義勝”
といった漢字(1つを除いて全部日本語)が本文に出ていて、更には1974年に周恩来と池田大作が会談してる写真(創価学会の刊行物)と、2013年に山口那津男と習近平が会談している写真(人民日報)も掲載されています。注釈にも興味深い名前が散見できますので、中国共産党による仏教の政治利用として読んでみてください。
◆The party in monk’s robes: The cultivation of global Buddhism within CCP influence operations【SINOPSIS 2022年7月18日】
The involvement of agencies across the PRC party-state in the cultivation of religious figures abroad points to the importance the CCP attaches to religion as a vessel of political influence. United front organs such as the Buddhist Association of China have targeted foreign religion since the Mao era, naturally extending a core domestic constituency. Beyond united front work, agencies from the CCP foreign affairs system and military intelligence also engage in religious influence abroad. The party’s influence agencies wear different robes to their engagement with religion in different foreign locales. This note samples this versatility of CCP influence work by reviewing three loci of the party’s exploitation of Buddhism. In Mongolia, the party embraces the Qing empire’s legacy, resuming a role as patron of Tibetan-transmitted Buddhism and overseer of reincarnation processes to counter the Dalai Lama’s influence. These imperial robes are, in fact, only recycled from what the party donned in Japan already under Mao: Buddhist exchanges as tokens of “peace” and “friendship” transcending politics helped build political ties that remain active today. In a Western country like Australia, Buddhism’s minority status allows CCP-linked Buddhist groups to reach mainstream politics by supplying officials with an easy shortcut to an image of multicultural engagement. Reincarnation, anti-militarism and multiculturalism, we finally observe, are concepts the party wears but does not genuinely espouse. Religion, we conclude, helps elucidate ideology’s role in influence work: foreign élites are as easily won by a Leninist party’s promises to “reform” or freely trade as an abbot might be by its donation of a monumental statue.