ウクライナとロシアの長い長い因縁の歴史、“ホロドモール”、スターリンが故意に引き起こした大飢饉は根深い因縁の中でも一際大きな出来事でしょうが、プーチンと(ワグネルまで含めた広義の)ロシア軍が執拗に民間施設やインフラ設備を破壊攻撃しているのも、スターリンの思考に倣ってやっているのでしょう。
スターリンが忌々しいことに逃れた分の責任も、プーチンと現ロシアにキッチリ負わせないといけません。
Anne Applebaum『Red Famine: Stalin’s War on Ukraine』
「ホロドモールは政策の失敗の結果であり、スターリンには大量虐殺するといった意図はなかった」というのは他にも小泉先生が前にチラッと書いてた
私が読んだ本等では、集団化への反対が特に多かった宇への弾圧と、ソ連体制への脅威となりうる宇のアイデンティティーを消し去る目的で起こしたとあった https://t.co/OaOkuYlss4
— キエ夫🇺🇦 (@Moskva_Daisuke1) November 28, 2022
英エコノミスト紙が決める年間最優秀本に贈るThe Best Book of the Yearを獲得したホロドモールについての"Red Famine"の作者、アン・アップルバウムさんが色々な所でホロドモールについての自説を解説しているのでそれを読むのが参考になると思う。https://t.co/DhGreYoYwH
— キエ夫🇺🇦 (@Moskva_Daisuke1) November 28, 2022
アップルバウム(以下ア)
「1932年には集団化と穀物強制収奪政策によってソ連全体(北コーカサス、カザフスタン等)で基金が起こっていた。その年の秋までにスターリンは、この危機を利用して宇をターゲットに定めた。農場や町、村がブラックリストに載せられ、人々は宇国外へ脱出する事を禁止された… pic.twitter.com/eG5M3DGJIL— キエ夫🇺🇦 (@Moskva_Daisuke1) November 28, 2022
…宇文化と宇語を弾圧する特別の措置も取られた。
私はこれらの決定が、より多くの宇人を殺害するために取られたもので、実際に多くの宇人が死亡し、宇共産党とソ連共産党はこの飢饉が起こっていたことを把握していたと思う。これは人為的な飢饉だ」
以下が引用元https://t.co/pnhFhRlz7A
— キエ夫🇺🇦 (@Moskva_Daisuke1) November 28, 2022
なぜスターリンは宇をターゲットにしたのか
ア「スターリンは反革命を恐れており、特に宇を恐れていた。ロシア内戦時に宇で大規模な農民反乱があったことを記憶していたし、その後の宇で集団化に反対する武装蜂起があったことも知っていた。… pic.twitter.com/RuH4HQ0aNB
— キエ夫🇺🇦 (@Moskva_Daisuke1) November 28, 2022
…1932年の秋には、20年代から行われていたウクライナ化政策(宇語と宇文化、宇のアイデンティティーを促進する政策)に終止符を打つ政策が採られた。スターリンはこれを反革命的で危険なものと見なしたからだ。…
— キエ夫🇺🇦 (@Moskva_Daisuke1) November 28, 2022
…つまり、宇知識人への弾圧と人為的飢饉は、宇から反革命(=ソ連に対する反体制運動)が起こること防ぐ為のものだった。」
— キエ夫🇺🇦 (@Moskva_Daisuke1) November 28, 2022
ア「私が思うに、スターリンにとって宇とは思想であった。独立した宇はソ連中央の権威への挑戦であり、潜在的にソ連そのものを揺るがし得るものであった。スターリンはこう信じたのだ。加えて、自立した宇は国外に同盟国を得る可能性があるとも考えた。特にポーランドだ。… pic.twitter.com/0ryob7DqXb
— キエ夫🇺🇦 (@Moskva_Daisuke1) November 28, 2022
…だからこそスターリンにとって、ウクライナという思想そのものを消し去ることが重要だった。スターリンはそれがソ連と言う思想への挑戦だと考えた。
そして、そう考えた彼は正しかったかもしれない。80年代と90年代の宇という思想の復活と1991年の宇の独立は、ソ連を終わらせる一因となった。」
— キエ夫🇺🇦 (@Moskva_Daisuke1) November 28, 2022
LSEのこの批評のように、Red Famineとアップルバウム氏について書かれた記事は多いので興味あれば読むべき。↓のからもう少しだけ訳出してみる。https://t.co/dqXLXNGjC3
— キエ夫🇺🇦 (@Moskva_Daisuke1) November 28, 2022
「飢饉の原因は集団化であり、飢饉は故意では無かったと見なす人々がいる。ロシア国内の歴史学で特にその傾向がある。アップルバウム氏は、集団化が状況をさらに悪化させはしたと認めつつも、集団化以上の事が起こっていたと主張する。食料不足が深刻になると、宇の人々はより反体制的になっていった.. pic.twitter.com/ZAVqUeCIpl
— キエ夫🇺🇦 (@Moskva_Daisuke1) November 28, 2022
ここでスターリンは、ブラックリスト作成と、苛烈な穀物強制徴収、国境の閉鎖を行った。国境閉鎖には二つの意図があった。一つはまだ続く宇のソ連に対する反体制運動を残らず潰す為であり、もう一つは国際社会から大飢饉の事実を隠す為であった。」 pic.twitter.com/fXQckNTyGB
— キエ夫🇺🇦 (@Moskva_Daisuke1) November 28, 2022
先ほどのRadioFreeEuropeの質問「何故スターリンは当時国際社会に助けを求めなかったのか?」に対してアップルバウムは、「スターリンは集団化は大成功だと宣伝していた為、国内外の人々に実態を知って欲しくなかったし、そもそも宇を対象にした人為的飢饉なので宇人を助けるつもりもなかった」と回答 pic.twitter.com/30LbaRgRAu
— キエ夫🇺🇦 (@Moskva_Daisuke1) November 28, 2022
◆Book Review: Red Famine: Stalin’s War on Ukraine by Anne Applebaum
【London School of Economics:Rose Deller 2018年5月9日】
The historiography on Soviet crimes is quite abundant, offering myriad interpretations throughout the Cold War and in the period after it. Anne Applebaum’s Red Famine: Stalin’s War on Ukraine is a new addition to this scholarship, focusing on the tragedy which befell the Ukrainian people under Joseph Stalin’s rule: namely, the Holodomor. This term has been used to define the genocide through hunger perpetrated between 1932 and 1933, causing the deaths of anywhere between 2 million and 12 million people. Some scholars have denied this description of the event by arguing that it was part of a wider famine, which hit other regions as well (Kazakhstan and the North Caucasus), although it is difficult to ignore Stalin’s disdain for Ukrainians, as expressed in his letters to Soviet politican Lazar Kaganovich. Anne Applebaum’s book stands as a synthesis of what has so far been researched, in terms of both archival documents and the expert analysis of various historians. As in her previous studies, she has combined this with written and oral testimonies, leading to a vivid account of the Holodomor. She makes an argument for its genocidal character, yet avoids a conclusion when it comes to the number of dead, arguing that the relative bureaucratic chaos of collectivisation and the Holodomor makes such an assessment impossible.
The author’s interest in the communist world is anything but new. Presently, Applebaum’s first book was the Pulitzer-winning Gulag: A History, in which she analysed the Soviet system of forced labour camps, drawing upon the accounts of its victims. Another major contribution is The Iron Curtain, an in-depth analysis of how the communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe not only took over politics, but also society.
In Red Famine, Applebaum analyses the struggle of the Ukrainian diaspora to make known their national tragedy. The subject first came to public awareness with the 1985 Harvest of Despair documentary. A year later, Robert Conquest published the book Harvest of Sorrow, which was based on the research undertaken at the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University, generating debates regarding the ethnicity of the dead and their estimated numbers in the absence of relevant primary sources. In the following decades, the number of academic publications focusing on these crimes increased. Among these, it is particularly worthwhile to mention Timothy Snyder’s Bloodlands, Norman Naimark’s Stalin’s Genocides and Terry Martin’s The Affirmative Action Empire. All three emphasise the role that Ukrainian identity played in Stalin’s decisions. Applebaum takes the same approach, focusing on the Bolshevik attitude towards the nationalities drawn together under the Soviet Union, while also explaining how collectivisation became a backdrop to genocide.
〔Image Credit: ‘The Memory Candle’ monument to victims of the Holodomor, Kiev, Ukraine (Jarosław Góralczyk CC BY SA 4.0)〕Applebaum’s analysis of Ukrainian identity starts from the time of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the sixteenth century and the Tsarist Empire (from as early as the ninth century, starting with the Kievan Rus, up to 1917). She argues that in both Polish and Russian, Ukrainian means ‘borderland’: this came to illustrate the future downplay of the distinctiveness of the Ukrainian nation. Moving forward in time to the first years of the Soviet Union, she attempts to explain the paradoxical Bolshevik attitude towards this part of their new empire. Firstly, the experience of the Civil War came to shape the Soviet view of both external and hidden internal enemies. This was a time marked by extreme unrest and division in Ukraine as three big armies fought with little regard for the population. This led to an obvious lack of trust between the emerging national movement (mostly a peasant movement, including the ill-fated 1917-21 Ukrainian People’s Republic) and the Moscow-led Communists. Yet it was something of an ambivalent attitude, as Bolshevik ideology also supported autonomy for the Soviet republics, and for almost a decade there was an effort made towards developing Ukrainian culture and identity.
But, by the end of the 1920s, there were clear signs that the central authorities were planning to close this down. While the ‘Shakhty Trial’ has become the preferred example for Soviet show trials against supposed saboteurs, little attention has been given to the trial of the ‘Spilka Vyzvolenia Ukrainy’ (SVO – Union for the Liberation of Ukraine). This saw around 30,000 people placed under arrest (mostly members of the elite), and marked the beginning of the attack on Ukrainian nationalism and its leadership. In the book, Applebaum manages to illustrate the difference between official discourse and Stalin’s actual paranoia-driven intentions towards internal enemies.
Here, we arrive at the second defining element of the book’s interpretation: collectivisation as the background to the genocide. There has been a tendency in some parts of the historiography (especially in Russia) to explain at least some aspects of the famine through the policies of collectivisation, in a sense making it an unwanted or ignored consequence. While Applebaum accepts that this did in fact worsen the situation of the peasantry, she argues that there was more to the policy. As the food shortages increased, people began reacting in a hostile manner towards the regime, but they were in an already-weakened state due to the annihilation of the elites in the SVU trial. This led to arrests and deportations, while peasants fled to cities.
It is here that collectivisation in Ukraine took a genocidal turn according to Applebaum, as in 1932 Stalin installed a repressive system involving the harsh requisitioning of food, the blacklisting of individuals and the closing down of borders. She ties these efforts of the regime into a double-faceted phenomenon. On the one hand, the regime aimed at breaking any remaining resistance, something which was achieved. On the other, blocking migration was an attempt at hiding the scale of the Ukrainian tragedy to protect the official image of economic and social progress. In reality, as acknowledged in the introduction, Stalin’s policies in Ukraine left millions dead, and the survivors traumatised.
There is little criticism that can be brought to the approach of Red Famine. One issue that could have been better explored is the Polish element to Stalin’s paranoia. While it is mentioned on several occasions, usually in reference to past Ukrainian experience and accounts of the Holodomor, Applebaum does not define it in relation to the regime’s motivations. This aspect is relevant to understanding Stalin’s offensive: there was a genuine fear among the Bolsheviks that Polish national ambitions could pose a threat to the Soviet Union’s territorial integrity. This only served to further increase Stalin’s paranoia with regards to hidden enemies, convincing him that there was a need for a cleansing of Ukraine. Nonetheless, Red Famine is certainly a very useful addition to the existing historiography, offering a gripping account of the disaster befalling the Ukrainian nation in the early 1930s.
Anne Applebaum『Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe, 1944-1956』
Timothy Snyder『Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin』
ティモシー・スナイダー『ブラッドランド――ヒトラーとスターリン 大虐殺の真実』〈上〉〈下〉
Norman Naimark『Stalin’s Genocides』
Terry Martin『The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939』